Cook Islands
The period under review was dominated by an unprecedented call for general elections, parliamentary confl icts, and budget approval constraints that at times tested the interpretation of the powers of the head of state. Ongoing out-migration of Cook Islanders, environmental problems, and continuing infl ation slipped under the radar as politicians pushed for major salary increases and most Cook Islanders struggled from paycheck to paycheck. The popular American television series Survivor, and some sporting successes, provided some respite, but an unpredictable tourist industry, technical personnel limitations, and occasional invasive diseases and insects reminded Cook Islanders to be constantly vigilant.
July 2006 began with continuing concern by many observers about the leak of the Queen's Honours list from the offi ce of Prime Minister Jim Marurai, which he dismissed as "unimportant" (CIN, 5 July, 4). Perhaps of more concern to Marurai were political undercurrents aimed toward replacing him and the Speaker of the House (CIN, 6 July 2006, 1). Meanwhile, one of the laws fi nalized by the Cook Islands Parliament was a Marriage Amendment Bill outlawing marriages between homosexuals. The law was clearly designed to counter the provisions of New Zealand's civil union legislation (CIN, 19 July 2006, 1) .
Government also committed itself to a variety of programs including the development of geotourism through an agreement signed by Tourism Minister Wilkie Rasmussen and Sarah Laskin, vice president of public and business development for National Geographic. The agreement obligated the island country to adhere to fourteen geotourism principles designed to sustain and enhance the geographic character of a given place, including the environment, culture, aesthetics, and the well-being of its people. In return, National Geographic promised to produce maps and brochures "which identify the unique features of the Cook Islands" (CIN, 2 Aug, 2006, 1). The Cook Islands becomes only the fourth country to accede to the charter.
In July Teina Bishop, member for Arutanga (Aitutaki), resigned from his cabinet post realigning himself with the opposition Cook Islands Party (cip). Not long after, Kiriau Turepu (cip) won the snap election for the Matavera (Rarotonga) constituency, potentially changing the balance of power in Parliament and creating a footing for a change of government (CIN, 20 July 2006, 1) . The political battle intensifi ed when opposition cip members met in Parliament without Democratic Party (Demo) government members. After swearing in the newly elected Kiriau Turepu, they voted the Demo government out. The event was broadcast live on national radio, attracting accusations of a coup attempt bordering on sedition and treason. The extraordinary chain of events became even more confusing when Queen's Representative Sir Frederick Goodwin called for a general election. This essentially negated the by-election just won by Turepu and preempted the later attempt by cip parliamentarians to use a vote of no confi dence to force a change of government (CIN, 25 July 2006). The high court was drawn into the drama amid accusations of political maneuvering on both sides of the aisle. Meanwhile, caretaker Prime Minister Jim Marurai tried to reassure the general population that there was no cause for alarm (CIN, 25 July 2006, 1). The election was set for 26 September 2006.
Sir Geoffrey Arama Henry announced his retirement from the Cook Islands Party leadership effective 31 August 2006, and as member of Parliament representing the Takuvaine (Rarotonga) constituency. Mark Brown replaced Henry as cip candidate for Takuvaine, and Tom Marsters, the member of Parliament for Murienua (Rarotonga), was eventually elected to lead the Cook Islands Party in Parliament (CIN, 13 Dec 2006, 1). The party now faces multiple challenges: new leadership, a seemingly overzealous head of state, possible court challenges, and a pending general election.
As candidates fi led their nominations for the elections, Wilkie Rasmussen switched his allegiance to the Democratic Party. He had originally won his seat by nine votes over Demo candidate Tepure Tapaitau CIN, 10 Aug 2006, 1). Apparently catching the campaign committee off guard, the Cook Islands Party failed to nominate a substitute candidate, so Rasmussen entered the election unopposed. The election was hotly contested for 23 of the 24 seats. After some recounts-and allegations of bribery involving bread, fi sh, pearls, and an excavator-the Democratic Party won a majority of seats and formed a government (CIN, 14 Oct 2006, 1; CIN, 27 Oct 2006, 1) .
During this intense election period, the caretaker government faced budgetary limitations, and the queen's representative issued an unprecedented decree authorizing bridging expenditure from 20 November to twelve sitting days after the fi rst meeting of the newly elected Parliament (CIN, 18 Nov 2006, 1) . In the subsequent debate over the intervention, New Zealand constitutional expert Dr Alex Frame warned that the claim of "necessity" cited by the head of state was diffi cult to justify (CIN, 18 Dec 2006, 1) . A second legal opinion by Dr William Hodges, a member of the Auckland University law faculty, supported Frame's remarks but added that the queen's representative "does have reserve powers 'to sustain and not to destroy' peace, order and good government as provided by the constitution" (CIN, 21 Dec 2006, 13) .
The national police provided one focus for the newly constituted Demo government when an eagerly awaited review identifi ed poor leadership, fi nancial mismanagement, and lack of public confi dence as key issues facing the force (CIN, 5 Dec 2006, 1) . In April, the cabinet appointed Patrick Tasker, a New Zealand inspector, as the new commissioner of police. The new commissioner will be expected to manage necessary changes while sustaining police operations (CIN, 28 April 2007, 1) . In another change, local Shola Ivaiti was named to replace Kevin Carr as fi nancial secretary (CIN, 23 Feb 2007, 1) . Earlier, former Solicitor General Janet Maki became the country's fi rst woman ombudsman, beginning her new job 15 November 2006 (CIN, 1 Nov 2006, 1). Her stated goal was to provide a public service that ensures government accountability (CIN, 3 Nov 2006, 3) .
The issue of fi sheries poaching emerged in December, when long-liner FV Tim Tam was captured by a police squad fi shing ninety nautical miles south-southwest of Penrhyn Island. The Tim Tam had a Korean captain and a crew made up of a Samoan, Fijian, Chinese, and three Taiwanese sailors (CIN, 6 Dec 2006, 1) . About seventeen tons of mostly albacore tuna on board were sold off cheaply to the general public in Rarotonga (CIN, 14 Dec 2006, 1). Skipper Yeong Bae Han was convicted and fi ned the minimum nz$100,000, a far cry from the legal maximum of nz$1 million (CIN, 16 Dec 2006, 1) . In May 2007, a Taiwanese long-lining vessel FV Yin Chen No 1 was caught fi shing illegally and Captain Man Liu Tsai was convicted in the high court. Noting that the vessel had made multiple excursions into the Cook Islands exclusive economic zone, the court ordered a fi ne of nz$200,000 plus nz$50,000 in costs (CIN, 24 May 2007, 1) .
Another focus for controversy was the Ports Authority Board, whose chairman Don Beer Jr was sacked by Cook Islands Investments Corporation (ciic) board chairman Julian Dashwood over plans to tour Auckland ports in February 2007. The decision to terminate Beer may have also been infl uenced by a December 2006 audit that claimed improper payments of over nz$30,000 for consultancy work (CIN, Feb 2007, 1) . Dashwood himself was later terminated after the change of government. "Maybe it's because I was trying to weed out corruption. I guess my standards are higher than theirs," declared Dashwood (CIN, 22 Feb 2007, 1) . The Chamber of Commerce weighed in on the controversy by expressing concern at the "apparent political interference shown by the sacking of Dashwood (CIN, 23 Feb 2007, 1) . Local businessman Sam "Gumby" Crocombe replaced Beer as the new chairman of the Ports Authority Board, while Tapi Taio replaced Dashwood as ciic chairman (CIN, 9 March 2007, 1).
In April 2007, the Chinese-funded National Police Headquarters in Avarua was fi nally opened with a ceremony led by Queen's Representative Sir Frederick Goodwin and the Chinese Ambassador Zhang Yuanyuan (CIN, 2 April 2007, 5) . The government revealed a Chinese-funded nz$7.5 million road-upgrading project for the 5.5-kilometer stretch of back road from Nikao to Takuvaine, to be completed in time for the 2009 South Pacifi c Mini Games (CIN, 14 March 2007, 1) . China also agreed to fund a new sports stadium for the Cook Islands with nz$4 million in aid, plus a further nz$2 million in concessional loans (CIN, 20 March 2007, 1) .
In January, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Immigration Wilkie Ras-mussen noted an increase in foreigners illegally working in the country. He warned that it was a serious issue and, after meeting with communities of Samoans, Fijians, Kiribati, and others, some twenty foreigners were given forty days to leave the country (CIN, 5 Jan 2007, 1; CIN, 25 May 2007, 1) .
As of December 2006, the Cook Islands total population including visitors was 19,569 (9,932 men and 9,637 women), an increase of 8. During this review period, the government launched the country's fi fteen-year sustainable development plan titled "Living the Cook Islands Vision-A 2020 Challenge" (Te Kaveinga Nui-Pathway for Sustain able Development in the Cook Islands). In a public meeting, hotel entrepreneur and economist Tata Crocombe called it a plan to nowhere, pointing out that it failed to incorporate some of the country's biggest problems such as depopulation, human resource development, aid dependence-and politicians. Moreover he observed that the government was too big (CIN, 25 Jan 2007, 1). Cabinet Minister Wilkie Rasmussen defended the government by pointing out that the issues mentioned by Crocombe were not new, labeling his comments as "purely ideals and theories of convenience" (CIN, 26 Jan 2007, 4) .
During the year, Tata Crocombe's sweetheart deal in purchasing the government-owned Rarotongan Hotel reemerged in the news. Tata Crocombe had been recruited by Sir Geoffrey Henry's government to broker the sale of state assets, but ended up purchasing the hotel himself for nz$3.25 million with no money down, and a grace period of ten years to pay back the money with no interest charges. The media noted that the ten-year period was ending in September 2007 (CIN, 18 Jan 2007, 1). Crocombe was also linked to a proposed Black Rock tourist development scheme incorporating the current golf course, Black Rock preschool, and Harley Street in Rarotonga (CIN, 25 Nov 2006, 1) .
Throughout the year under review, religion maintained a powerful infl uence on politics. The Religious Advisor Council (rac), representing the Cook Islands Christian Church, Catholic, Seventh-Day Adventist, Latter-day Saints, Assembly of God and Apostolic Church denominations, was regularly called on to offer invocations and benedictions at government functions and events. In July 2006, the council issued a call for a national day to pray and fast for the political "circus" occurring in the Cook Islands. The rac chairman, Pastor Tutai Pere, declared that the tiny nation needed "deliverance from further political bondage of disunity, instability and uncertainty" (CIN, 6 July 2006, 1). In another public display of political pressure, Ngatangiia Cook Islands Christian Church Pastor Iana Aitau asked police to enforce a ban preventing people from swimming or surfi ng on Sundays. The police responded that they could only ask people but in effect could not enforce such a rule (CIN, 11 July 2006, 1).
In 2007 Cook Islanders appeared in third place on a list of the world's fattest countries. Nauru topped the list with the greatest percentage of overweight adults (94.5 percent) followed by Federated States of Micronesia, Cook Islands, Niue, Tonga, Sämoa, Palau, and Kiribati. The United States follows in ninth place (74.1 percent). Conducted by the United Nations World Health Western Pacifi c Regional offi ce and the London-based International Obesity Task Force, researchers looked at the adult population over age fi fteen. Obesity rates highlighted imbalances between levels of physical activity, and signifi cant changes in diet (CIN, 21 Feb 2007, 1) .
The review period also saw a sharp rise in dengue fever cases (CIN, 14 Feb 2007, 1) . The Cook Islands Ministry of Health fi nally responded with plans for a mosquito-spraying blitz (CIN, 15 Feb 2007, 1) . Although the use of Reslin in the spray and its potentially toxic effects received some heavy criticism from the public, spraying continued anyway (CIN, 18 April 2007, 1) . A total of 1,394 cases of dengue have been recorded since May 2006, with most (1,296) having occurred in Rarotonga. Some nineteen tourists were affected.
Educational initiatives were also in the news during the year. Thirty-fi ve students enrolled in the University of the South Pacifi c's new Master of Business Administration program, most being heads of departments paying their own way (CIN, 16 Feb 2007, 1) . The usp center also received a nz$300,000 upgrade (CIN, 25 June 2007, 1). On the downside, the Cook Islands government withdrew its support for the South Pacifi c School of Medicine set up in Rarotonga on 16 March 2004. It was to be a twoyear course costing foreign students us$39,000 (nz$56,000). The government removed its backing after discovering that the founder, controversial American Dr Larry Sands, had been convicted of mail fraud, and disciplined for prescribing wrong medicines (CIN, 21 March 2007, 1) .
By July of 2006, the popular television series American Survivor had begun fi lming its "reality game" on Aitutaki. Filming in Cook Islands was completed by 4 August, and Tourism Authority chief executive Chris Wong revealed that the production had injected an estimated nz$3 million into the Cook Islands economy (CIN, 5 August 2006, 1) . Exposure of the Cook Islands to over 16 million people in the United States alone was expected to increase visitors to the country. Wong stated, "Our hope is that outside entertainment value that reality tv shows provide, viewers will fi nd the natural attractions of the country highly appealing and consider the Cook Islands as an option for an island vacation" (CIN, 20 Jan 2007, 7) .
Another attraction in the Cook Islands during the year was the traditional canoe-building project, Te Mire Tarai Vaka (CIN, 18 July 2006, 1). However the most challenging sporting event was the third Vaka Eiva, a canoe race around the island of Rarotonga involving thirty-fi ve teams of canoe paddlers from New Zealand, Australia, Hawai'i, Fiji, Niue, Tahiti, and Cook Islands (CIN, 17 Nov 2006, 1-17) .
The year under review was also marked by drug and criminal activities. Cocaine bound for Rarotonga and valued at nz$5.6 million was seized in Auckland. Hidden in the linings of two suitcases, the cocaine is believed to have come from São Paulo, South America. It is uncertain whether Rarotonga was the fi nal destination or a transit point to the Australian market (CIN, 29 Nov 2006, 1). An unprovoked stabbing of an unarmed youth brought the realities of big city violence to Rarotonga, with Cook Islands police declaring their determination to stamp it out (CIN, 21 Dec 2006, 1). The Religious Advisory Council reacted to the stabbing by calling for the formation of a youth action team dubbed "Youth for Life-Mapu Kia Ora" (CIN, 22 Dec 2006, 1) .
Cook Islanders continued to take a deep interest in environmental issues. As active participants in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol since 1992, the Cook Islands joined other island countries in a plea for a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to larger countries that contribute most to global warming. Island nations have been described as "the conscience" on climate change (CIN, 21 Dec 2006, 5) . The Cook Islands is already being impacted by climatic changes, particularly with regard to its tourism and pearl industries (CIN, 16 April 2007, 3) .
As part of the government's plan to reduce dependency on fossil oil, a wind energy farm project was proposed at Kiikii on the island of Rarotonga (CIN, 24 Jan 2007, 1). Preliminary testing for persistent organic pollutants (pops) in Rarotonga lagoons indicated concentrations of chlorinated pesticide (ddt and methoxychlor), polycyclice aromatic hydrocarbons (pah) and phthalates (dehp) above the detection limit. Environmentalist Imogen Ingram pointed out that the government needed to take positive action to remedy the environmental challenge because it was a signatory to the Stockholm Convention that agreed to a total eradication of pops (CIN, 15 Nov 2006, 7) .
Another problem that emerged during the year took the form of the glassy-winged "sharpshooter" bug. Discovered in Rarotonga, and suspected to have arrived on plants smuggled in from Tahiti, the insect feeds on more than three hundred host plants including trees, crops, and plants such as hibiscus, gardenia, and papaya. It is also known to transmit Pierce's disease, which affects grapevines (CIN, 4 April 2007, 1, 7) . In more positive environmental news, the year marked the return of the kura or lorikeet bird, which was once plentiful on the island of Atiu. Before it became almost extinct, its feathers were used for the cloaks and headdresses of high chiefs. In a joint effort in April, naturalists and Atiuans brought in twenty-seven birds from Rimatara Island in French Polynesia (CIN, 28 April 2007, 1).
As After the president left, the protesters removed the roadblocks, but on 21 October they occupied the presidential palace, the vice president's offi ce, and the assembly building. Temaru interpreted this as an attempted coup and, from Suva, requested that the French security forces intervene. During the night of 22-23 October, French paramilitary police squads, under orders from the high commission, intervened to liberate the occupied buildings. They used teargas to disperse the protesters in front of the assembly building after some of them turned violent (TP, 23 Oct 2007) .
After the president's return, the strike leaders called a demonstration and demanded the resignation of High Commissioner Boquet, but only about two hundred people showed up for the march. The blockades were interpreted, not as expressions of public dissatisfaction, but rather as maneuvers manipulated by the political opposition (TPM, Nov 2006 While the government thus continued to pursue its policy of pan-Pacifi c cooperation and cultural renaissance, its political foundation in the assembly became more and more shaky. Months before, insurmountable tensions had developed within the bare majority upld coalition, and in April 2006, Temaru's main coalition partner Emile Ver naudon left the coalition and allied himself with the pro-French Tahoeraa opposition of former President Gaston Flosse. Temaru, however, had temporarily saved his assembly majority through a makeshift alliance with four opportunistic representatives from the Tuamotu and Marquesas islands, who were originally elected on a Tahoeraa list in 2004 but had frequently changed sides. Due to the unreliability of the four representatives, Temaru's new majority proved to be very unstable. In October and November, threats of a new political switch were expressed by the four, subsequently known as "Islanders," and by late November it was unclear who held the majority (TP, 22 Nov 2006; TPM, Dec 2006). However, after long debates and delays, the budget for 2007 was fi nally passed on 7 December with the votes of the upld, including the four "Islanders," so that the government's majority appeared to be once more secured (TP, 7 Dec 2006) .
Only a few days later, the opposition fi led a motion of censure. Surprisingly, the motion was passed on 13 December, with a bare majority of twenty-nine votes, making it clear that two of the "Islanders" had indeed changed sides again, while the two Fetia Api representatives had given up their neutrality and joined the opposition (TP, 13 Dec 2006). In the following two weeks, while Temaru's government remained in offi ce as a caretaker administration, a new majority coalition under the name of "Autonomist platform" was formed, comprising Flosse's Tahoeraa, Vernaudon's Ai'a Api, Jean-Christophe Bouissou's Rautahi (which had split from Tahoeraa), and the four "Islanders." As both Flosse and his son-in-law and designated successor Edouard Fritch were unacceptable to the smaller coalition partners, Bora Bora Mayor Gaston Tong Sang, who had been lands minister under Flosse, was designated as the new majority's presidential candidate (pir, 21 Dec 2007).
On 26 December, Tong Sang was elected to be the new president with a majority of 31 votes, against 26 for Temaru. Besides the members of the new coalition, the two representatives of Fetia Api had also voted for Tong Sang. In his inaugural speech, the new president promised to consolidate the country's fi nancial situation and cooperate more constructively with the The new president, born to a Chinese-Polynesian family on Bora Bora, received an engineer's diploma in France and headed the municipality of his home island since 1989. Within the Tahoeraa party he was considered to be a rational technocrat (DT, 27 Dec 2007) .
Three days after his election, Tong Sang presented his cabinet of fi fteen ministers. Temauri Foster, Mayor of Hao atoll and leader of the four "Islanders," was appointed vice president and minister for Municipal Development. Seven ministers were from Tahoeraa, most of them former ministers under Flosse, including Teva Rohfritsch (Economy and Labor), Armelle Merceron (Finance), Tearii Alpha (Education), Jules Ienfa (Health), Madeleine Brémond (Social and Family Affairs and Housing), and Frédéric Riveta (Agriculture). Interesting to note was the absence of Gaston Flosse and most of his inner circle. Also striking was the overrepresentation of the "Islanders," with four cabinet ministers-besides Vice President Foster, there were Moehau Teriitahi (Outer Island Development), Louis Frébault (Equipment), and Michel Yip (Postal Services, Telecommunications, and Pearl Farming)-and of the two small coalition parties with two ministers each: Maina Sage (Tourism and Environment) and Moana Blanchard (Transportation) for Rautahi; Natacha Taurua (Culture) and Clarenntz Vernaudon (Youth and Sports) for Ai'a Api. The "Islanders" had thus played the political power game very successfully. Beginning as Tahoeraa backbenchers, within two years they rose to become the "kingmakers" in the assembly and received leading positions in the new cabinet (DT, 30 Dec 2007) .
This pattern of opportunistic behavior by the "Islanders" led to strong criticism among the population. In more general terms, it was pointed out that the outer islands were overrepresented in the new cabinet in comparison to Tahiti (where more than 70 percent of the population live). Besides that, within a few days of the appointment of the new cabinet, tensions developed within Tahoeraa, between the hard core of Flosse followers and the rest of the party. At the fi rst assembly session of the New Year on 11 January, the new government lacked a majority because Flosse and two other Tahoeraa representatives were absent. The upld therefore immediately fi led a motion of censure against Tong Sang, but it was eventually defeated (TPM, Feb 2007; TP, 18 Jan 2007) .
The turning of the year thus marked, for the time being, the end of the barely two-year-long political experiment of "Taui" (change) under Temaru's leadership. This was regarded with mixed feelings. Most people seemed to be generally disappointed with politics and showed neither grief nor joy about the change of government. While there was a degree of discontent regarding the return of the Tahoeraa after the previous experience of almost twenty years of increasingly corrupt rule by Flosse, the initial euphoria for Temaru's "Taui" policy had also begun to fade away. Even though Temaru is indeed one of the few local politicians to have a true vision for the country's future, his government undertook only a few concrete steps to implement this vision. Further, despite the promise to break with the system of nepotism and corruption established under Flosse, many upld government offi cials had engaged in similar activities. In addition, Temaru's plans to lead the country into independence were regularly attacked by the opposition, and many people were infl uenced by their proFrench propaganda. Unfortunately, most upld politicians failed to rigorously uphold their moral standards and implement their political visions.
After their initial attempt to oust the Tong Sang government proved unsuccessful, the now opposition upld announced that it would still continue to do whatever it could to get the new government, which they considered illegitimate, removed from offi ce. For several consecutive weeks during late January and February, several hundred Temaru followers held weekly demonstrations against Tong Sang, demanding his resignation. The reason for the protests was an ongoing judicial inquiry against Tong Sang, who as Flosse's minister of land affairs had been involved in a corruption affair in the early 2000s. At one of the protest events, Temaru argued that ethical standards require a politician to at least temporarily resign from offi ce during a judicial inquiry (TP, 31 Jan, 7 Feb 2007). Temaru also expressed his hope that Socialist candidate Ségolène Royal might win the upcoming French presidential elections, and subsequently his party campaigned vigorously for her. This was something completely new, as Tavini Huiraatira used to boycott French presidential elections.
In early January, Tong Sang traveled to France to meet President Jacques Chirac and other French government offi cials in order to revive relations with Paris that had cooled down under Temaru (TP, 16 Jan 2007). That the new French Polynesian president was able to get an appointment with Chirac barely two weeks after his election, while Temaru had had to wait more than a year for such a meeting, clearly confi rmed that Paris was politically biased toward Papeete. Tong Sang was also able to successfully lobby the French Parliament, and on 24 January the National Assembly voted to change the election system of French Polynesia by deleting the one-third-of-seats bonus. This In March 2007, the struggle over nuclear follow-up resumed. The French delegate for nuclear safety, Marcel Jurien de la Gravière, went to Tahiti to present an offi cial report by the French Ministry of Defense on the radiological impact of nuclear testing (TP, 6 March 2007). The report admits some negative effects, but continues to downplay their signifi cance. Moruroa e Tatou strongly criticized the report. The Tong Sang administration, however, had weakened the position of the test victim association by replacing anti-nuclear assembly members and Moruroa e Tatou members with bureaucrats in the government- While the new government proved to be an obedient puppet of Paris regarding the nuclear question, it remained very unstable. On 1 March the "Islanders" had founded their own party, called Te Niu Hau Manahune (the foundation of democracy). Together with the two other minor coalition parties, Rautahi and Ai'a Api, they created a third parliamentary group named "Polynésiens Ensemble" (Polynesians Together) in the assembly (TP, 1 March 2007) . This proved to be another destabilizing factor for the majority. Several members of Tahoreaa broke away from their party and joined the new group, while Flosse clashed with some of the "Islanders" over budgetary issues (TP, 23 and 24 March 2007) .
On 12 April, the deep rift within the ruling coalition became even more apparent when two pro-government candidates were presented for the yearly reelection of the assembly's Speaker. While Edouard Fritch represented Tahoeraa, Hiro Tefaarere (an ex-upld representative who is now part of Ai'a Api) was the candidate of the Polynésiens Ensemble group. In the fi rst round of the election, upld candidate Antony Geros received a majority of 26 votes, against 21 for Fritch, 8 for Tefaarere, and 2 abstentions (the two Fetia Api representatives). In a second round, Fritch received only 18 votes and Tefaarere 11, while Geros's votes remained constant. In a fi nal runoff, Fritch received a majority of only 28 votes against 27 for Geros and 2 abstentions. One of the government representatives had apparently voted for Geros rather than for Fritch (TP, 12 Apr 2007) .
While the upld opposition stood strong and united, President Tong Sang's coalition government experienced a serious crisis only four months after his inauguration. Apparently, a power struggle was being fought between Gaston Flosse's Tahoeraa core group and a heterogeneous group of younger, more opportunistic politicians who stood behind Tong Sang. The latter group was on the winning side, at least it seemed so at fi rst. While the Flosse faction had won some points by electing Fritch as the assembly speaker, more representatives defected to the other faction. Immediately after Fritch's election, three Tahoeraa representatives from the Leeward Islands, Tong Sang's home archipelago, entered the Polynésiens Ensemble group, and were subsequently threatened with exclusion from Tahoeraa. Rumors spread regarding the possible resignation or exclusion from the party of even President Tong Sang himself (TPM, May 2006; TP, (TPM, Feb and March 2007) . In this case, all the pro-French parties of the ruling coalition supported Sarkozy, as he was the candidate of Chirac's ump party (TP, 18 April 2007). The upld fi rmly supported Royal, and lead a march of 5,000 people in her favor before the election, hoping that her administration would adopt a more constructive attitude toward Tahiti than the strongly partisan Chirac administration (TP, 14 April 2007). The result of the two election rounds shows that the polarization of the political landscape into two almost equal camps had consolidated, while the parties of the "third way," Fetia Api and No Oe E Te Nunaa, which supported Bayrou, were in decline.
It was interesting to note that Sarkozy was not leading the runoff vote in all municipalities of Tahiti, and was leading in only a few of the outer islands. On the political scene over the past year, the racist attitudes toward Mäori that continue to dominate the New Zealand Parliament resulted in on going and increasing tension between Mäori and the government on many issues. Mäori have once again had to resort to protest actions, as the government repeatedly denied us our legal rights. This time, however, coordinated protests across the country in response to refusals to return stolen lands resulted in the government's backing down and calling a temporary truce on that particular issue. For apart from strong judicial backing, particularly from the Waitangi Tribunal, and international condemnation from the United Nations (Staven hagen 2006), the presence of the small but very effective independent Mäori voice in Parliament, the Mäori Party, is ensuring that Mäori issues are no longer determined solely according to the racist whim of the major parties in the House.
The area that continued to be the major source of the tension was the settlement of Treaty of Waitangi claims. British immigrants, who settled New Zealand in large numbers beginning in the 1850s, have long sought to get rid of the Treaty of Waitangi. For over a century they simply ignored the treaty, and the courts sanctioned their behavior. But in the aftermath of World War II, international agreements outlawing racial discrimination, along with highly visible and embarrassing Mäori protests, forced the New Zealand government to establish the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975. The brief of the tribunal is to inquire into Mäori claims of breaches of the treaty. Initially, the government of the day did not expect the tribunal to hear many claims, meet often, or cost much (Oliver 1991, 9-10). But by the 1990s the tribunal was building an extremely bleak and ever-expanding record of extensive and serious atrocities committed against Mäori. In an effort to limit its liabilities in the area, the national government announced in 1994 that it wanted to settle the claims. It accepted responsibility for the atrocities and was prepared to compensate Mäori-but the money set aside for the settlements would be restricted to an arbitrarily set nz$1 billion, and the government would avoid returning any land if it could get away with it.
Since 1994 Mäori have fought against this policy, which was drawn up unilaterally by the government with no Mäori input, and is deeply racist in intent. Even in the face of ongoing and strident Mäori, judicial, and international criticism, no National or Labour government has been prepared either to amend the policy or to withdraw it and start again. As more and more claimants are being bullied into accepting pitiful settlements, it is now becoming clear that the primary aim of the policy is to get Mäori around the country to agree that they should extinguish rather than settle their Treaty of Waitangi claims. Furthermore, in doing so, they are also effectively agreeing to a systematic extinguishment of the Treaty of Waitangi itself.
Legislation is currently before Parliament to remove all references to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi from all legislation, and to date this has had the support of the present coalition government. To try to minimize international backlash, the New Zealand government joined Australia, Canada, and the United States in November 2006 in opposing the adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Mäori have supported and worked on the declaration for twenty years.
The Treaty of Waitangi Claims Settlement policy is designed to legislatively absolve the Crown of any and all liability and responsibility for its innumerable historical breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi and the theft of more than 90 percent of the country's lands and resources from Mäori. The government does this by bullying select groups of Mäori, purportedly representing "large natural groupings" of many thousands of other Mäori, into agreements that are legally binding and unchallengeable. The primary aim of the agreements is to provide (1) full and legally unchallengeable removal of legal liability for all breaches of the Treaty of Wai tangi, both identifi ed and unidentifi ed, committed in a particular geographic area prior to 1992; (2) full and legally unchallengeable acceptance by the iwi of all discriminatory legislation, including the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, along with all assertions of Crown authority, dominance, and sovereignty over Mäori; and (3) full and legally unchallengeable acceptance that the iwi has relinquished all their sovereign rights and authority over the identifi ed geographic area to the Crown.
In exchange for that agreement the Crown is prepared to make an apology for the breaches committed prior to 1992 (but not to stop committing further breaches) and to transfer a few acres of land. And while money is always mentioned as being part of settlements, if claimants want land returned they must use the money offered (and often borrow more as well) to buy the land from the Crown. As one would expect, the policy has caused huge divisions and strife within iwi. The Crown actively and openly fosters and exploits such divisions as it moves on relentlessly to achieve maximum implementation of its policy.
Of course, protection of Mäori from all of these situations is presently guaranteed by the Treaty of Wai tangi. The authoritative Mäori version promises that the Crown shall have governance over its own subjects only, that Mäori sovereignty is recognized and upheld, and that Mäori have the rights of all British citizens. The courts have repeatedly confi rmed that the treaty is the country's founding document. Had the Crown been able to control the rapacious greed of British immigrants in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it would not now be faced with remedying the wrongs as well as addressing the racism that has been allowed to develop and become deeply entrenched in the Päkehä psyche. Mäori have made it very clear that delaying remedies to the situation will not make it go away. And neither can legislative sleights of hand ever extinguish the Treaty of Waitangi.
Since mid-2006 the Crown has been dealing with twenty settlements. The Ngäti Mutunga Settlement Bill was enacted in November. It provides nz$14.9 million for Ngäti Mutunga to buy back some of the 150,000 acres the Crown had stolen from them. The land alone has an estimated monetary value of nz$5.19 billion (based on the nz$34,545 per acre paid to a Päkehä who had his land confi scated for Te Röroa's treaty claims)-making the settlement payment equivalent to less than 0.3 percent of the value of the land stolen. The Settlement Act acknowledges that the settlement does not compensate Ngäti Mutunga for the atrocities committed against them. These include the rape, murder, and illegal incarceration of large numbers of the iwi; the government's waging war on them when they refused to give their lands to British settlers; the government's confi scating all of their lands; and many other breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi that they have suffered and continue to suffer. But the act then says that Ngäti Mutunga has foregone full compensation, as its contribution to the "development of New Zealand," and thus the settlement is full and fi nal (Bennion 2007 [Feb] , 6). During the House debate on the bill, the Mäori Party was scathing of the government's mean-spiritedness, referring repeatedly to the Crown as "the thief." Party members advised Ngäti Mutunga to revisit the settlement in generations to come with a view to being properly compensated, and not to accept the "full and fi nal" stipulation of the Crown (Mäori Party 2007b).
Te Röroa's Claims Settlement Bill came before the House in March 2007. Te Röroa is a hapü of Ngäti Whatua who were left virtually landless. (A hapü is a grouping of a large number of extended families.) They fi rst complained to the Crown about breaches of the treaty one hundred sixty-fi ve years ago, yet for several generations they have been under relentless attack from Crown officials who denied them their legal and human rights. The Waitangi Tribunal upheld all their claims in 1992, detailing countless atrocities perpetrated against them by the Crown (Waitangi Tribunal 1992). Te Röroa has been in negotiations for more than fi fteen years. The settlement is for nz$9.5 million to be used to buy back from the Crown a small portion of Te Röroa's land, now being used commercially. Extensive wähi tapu (sacred sites) were stolen from them, and two thousand acres of these are returned in the settlement (Offi ce of Treaty Settlements 2005).
In the House, the Mäori Party protested that Te Röroa had been subjected to "a negotiations process drafted by the Crown, and the Crown alone, based on false faith and double-talk. It is a negotiations process that masquerades as being fair and reasonable in the circumstances but which, in fact, is anything but, and an empty insistence by the Crown that all settlements be full and fi nal-an insistence that will haunt this Chamber long after it is cleared." They warned that unfair settlements such as the one imposed in 2007 would be revisited by future generations. They also noted that considerably less land than what the Waitangi Tribunal had recommended was being returned to Te Röroa. They informed the House "that an apology and a return of less than 3 percent of the claim value pepper-potted throughout the tribal homeland of Te Röroa will simply not suffi ce" (Bennion 2007 [March], 6, 7).
In June 2006, Ngäti Whätua ki Öräkei hapü signed an agreement in principle to settle their claims to the Auckland isthmus. It agreed to vest three volcanic cones and land around Pürewa Creek in the hapü, but the lands are to be managed jointly by the hapü and the Auckland City Council with the council controlling the funds. The settlement is for nz$8 million, to be used as partial payment for up to nz$80 million of Ministry of Defence lands at Devonport-which they can buy from the Crown, provided they lease them back to the Crown and the Crown pays no rent for thirty years (Bennion 2006 [June], 8). The agreement came under serious threat when six other hapü with claims over the same area took the matter to the Waitangi Tribunal for an urgent hearing to prevent their claims being extinguished by such a settlement. The hearings took place in March 2007. The Offi ce of Treaty Settlements, which manages negotiations for the Crown, came under severe criticism from the tribunal when it was revealed that, in addition to wrongfully treating claimants and fomenting divisions among the iwi of Auckland, they had withheld crucial evidence from the tribunal during the inquiry and misled the tribunal (Waitangi Tribunal 2007,  101) .
In September 2006, the Te Arawa Lakes Settlement Bill was enacted. The lakes in the central North Island include Lake Rotorua and have been severely polluted by farm runoff and sewage disposal. The nz$10 million settlement returns the lakebeds to Te Arawa, leaving them to consider a cleanup that is estimated to cost nz$200 million, even though Te Arawa is specifi cally not liable for the pollution. The settlement extends Crown theft of Mäori assets in that it claims ownership not only of the water in the lakes but also the airspace above them. (The term "Crown stratum" is currently being used to describe the redefi ned space above the lakebed.) In the House during the debate on this bill, the Mäori Party tabled a report on Mäori experiences of the Treaty of Waitangi Settlement negotiations that demonstrates strong and universal condemnation of the process by claimants. Once again the Mäori Party warned that these settlements cannot be full and fi nal and will be revisited.
Attempts by the government to force a settlement of a portion of the huge central North Island forestry claims relating to the Kaingaroa forest and other lands around Rotorua triggered a series of court actions. Of direct relevance to these claims is the Crown Forestry Rental Trust, which was set up in 1990 to hold forestry rental money in trust pending successful claims to forestry lands. The trust now holds well over nz$400 million, of which almost nz$190 million is for the Kaingaroa forest. On top of that the Crown Forest Assets Act 1989 provides for the transfer of Crown forest land, plus compensation to Mäori once their claims to the land have been upheld by the Waitangi Tribunal. Claims to the central North Island, including the Kaingaroa forest, have been before the tribunal for some time and the tribunal issued its report upholding the claims in June 2007.
In a truly staggering example of arrogance and deceit the Crown managed to persuade part of the Te Arawa confederation of iwi, who are one of a very large number of claimants to the Kaingaroa forest, to settle Te Arawa's historical claims by giving over to the Crown nz$40.985 million in forestry rentals set aside for the Mäori owners of the lands. In addition, the Crown persuaded them to use the remainder of their rental money plus another nz$8 million (which they have to borrow from elsewhere) to buy from the Crown the land that is rightfully theirs under the Crown Forest Assets Act 1989. The Crown stands to make a nz$90 million profi t if they pass legislation to settle the claims along these lines. It will be able to do so after having convinced the claimants to enter into an agreement that allows the Crown to become a benefi ciary of the Crown Forestry Rental Trust (at present only those with successful claims to the land can be benefi ciaries of the trust). The claimants also have to agree to the Crown's selling the land in question to Mäori (land that the tribunal is likely to fi nd belongs to the claimants and other Mäori anyway). The Federation of Mäori Authorities and the New Zealand Mäori Council are currently pursuing the matter through the courts. The Waitangi Tribunal has issued a strongly worded report saying that it cannot endorse the settlement and that it has grave concerns over the potential negative impacts on the interests of other iwi with claims on the same land.
However, in the Far North, one iwi, Ngäti Kahu, took a very different approach. They withdrew from negotiations after the Crown started to sell off part of Ngäti Kahu's Rangiputa block, currently being used by the government's farming enterprise, Landcorp. In 1997, the tribunal had indicated that it would make binding recommendations in order to return Rangiputa to Ngäti Kahu if negotiations with the government failed. Since 1997, successive governments have threatened Ngäti Kahu that if they do seek binding recommendations under the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986, the government will repeal the act. Once negotiations with the Crown had ceased, Ngäti Kahu moved on to the land, repossessing it. Their stance started a chain reaction as other iwi, whose lands were also being sold by Landcorp, took similar action. A protest march in the Far North town of Kaitäia in support of the repossession was the biggest the town has ever seen. In the House the Mäori Party relentlessly pursued the government over the issue, calling on all iwi to follow suit and repossess their lands. After two weeks the government backed down and temporarily withdrew the lands from sale. Each of the iwi concerned is now pursuing binding recommenda- 
Rapa Nui
The year under review marked the beginning of great political change on Rapa Nui. In a long process initiated by the Chilean president, a draft bill for an organic law providing a special political status for the island was elaborated, while the Chilean constitution was fi nally amended to create the administrative category of a special territory. On the local political landscape, there was a shift away from the local elite at the election for the local Development Commission, with two opposition and pro-independence candidates receiving the highest numbers of votes.
The period under review started with the loss of one of the most important political fi gures of the island's recent history. In mid-August 2006, veteran opposition and proindependence leader Juan Chávez passed away at age eighty-two (Rapa Nui resident Stephanie Pauly, pers comm, 13 March 2007). One of the cofounders of the Rapanui Council of Elders in the 1980s, Chávez had led various initiatives of resistance against the Chilean government, and since 2001 he had been the president of the pro-independence Rapanui Parliament. He was also renowned as one of the island's most culturally knowledgeable koro (elders). At the time of this writing, no successor has been named to head the Rapanui Parliament, but within the months following Chávez's death, the pro-independence forces consolidated themselves once more under its umbrella.
At the same time, the controversy about a planned casino on the island was resolved in September 2006, when the Chilean authorities once again refused to grant permission, thus stopping the project indefi nitely. The reason for the refusal was the incompatibility of the juridical status of the island with Chilean gambling legislation. Also the nonexistence of income taxes on the island would have made it impossible for the Chilean fi scal authorities to track the earnings of the casino (Noticias de Rapa Nui, Sept 2006). The casino project, a joint venture between the Chilean company Grupo Martinez-am Holding and Rapanui entrepreneur Petero Riroroko, had stirred up passionate debates within the community. While it had the support of Mayor Petero Edmunds and Council of Elders President Alberto Hotus, former Governor Enrique Pakarati had strongly opposed the project, along with Rapanui organizations on the Chilean continent, and apparently most of the local population. The demise of the plan was therefore greeted with much joy and relief on the island, while it represented a severe setback for the political ambitions of Edmunds and Hotus.
Although there will be no gambling on the island, the tourism industry and the immigration of Chilean settlers continue to grow, leading to constant infrastructure problems such as traffi c jams and electricity blackouts (RNJ, Oct 2007). In November 2006, Chile's Public Works Ministry announced that it would spend us$2.4 million on improving the road network in order to facilitate access from the capital Hanga Roa to Ovahe and Anakena beaches, and to some of the more remote moai (statues) for which the island is famous. It was announced that once the road network has been completed, Rapa Nui would have a forty-six-kilometer-long circuit, intended to attract more tourists to the island (Santiago Times, 12 Nov 2006).
The main issue during the year, however, was the project for a special administrative statute for the island. Currently a municipality and a province within the continental Chilean region of Valparaíso, Rapa Nui is supposed to become a special territory outside of the normal Chilean administrative system, and will be placed directly under the national government in Santiago. The fi rst step toward achieving this new political status will be to change the Chilean constitution in order to create the administrative category of a special territory. Second, an organic law must be passed to specify the administrative system in that territory. Debates regarding the new statute have been going on both locally and in Chile for years, and thus the parliamentary process has progressed very slowly. The results of the ninemonth working group were publicly discussed at the seminar-with the participation of both the local authorities and the general public-and the conclusions were presented to the undersecretary for further elaboration with the president (subdere, 24 and 26 Jan 2007). The process of drafting the bill has thus become much more transparent, with the local opposition now willing to participate (Rapanui Parliament member Inés Teave, pers comm, 12 July 2007).
The draft bill, currently still in the making, can be summarized as follows in its latest version as of July 2007 (Government of Chile 2007a): An introduction recognizes the Rapanui as an indigenous people with a special ethnic, social, and cultural identity (article 1). While the bill reinforces the sovereignty of Chile by citing the 1888 annexation document signed by the local chiefs, the title of the Rapanui population to all the land of the island is clearly recognized, and any title currently claimed by the Chilean state is classifi ed as title held in trust on behalf of the Rapanui people (article 3).
The new administrative framework created by the bill would consist of a governor, a Rapanui Development Council, directors of the local government departments, the Council of Elders, and a Rapanui Development Corporation. The governor would be appointed by the Chilean president and must be ethnic Rapanui. As the Chilean State representative, he or she would direct all the responsibilities of the Chilean government on the island, and would be at the same level as an intendante (regional administrator) on the Chilean continent. The governor would also direct the local administration in collaboration with the Rapanui Development Council (articles 8-16 ). This council would be composed of the governor and six members elected for a four-year term by the native Rapanui community. The council would have the right to formulate development policies in all social, cultural, and economic fi elds, similar to a regional council in Chile, and have a say in the attribution of funds within the local administration. The governor would have the power to veto its decisions within ten days, but the veto could be overridden by a two-thirds majority of the council (articles 17-28, 30-33). The council would also have the authority to recommend to the Chilean president the removal of the governor (article 11g).
The local government apparatus would be structured into fi ve departments (infrastructure, lands and resources, economic development, culture and education, planning and social affairs), each headed by a direc-tor appointed by the governor after being approved by the Development Council. Each department would exercise the responsibilities of the respective national Chilean ministry or ministries on the island (articles 33-36). While the Rapanui governor's offi ce and the Development Council would be within the budget of the Chilean Ministry of Interior (article 37), an investment fund would be established for local development projects (articles 38-42).
The Council of Elders, as a recognized traditional institution representing each native family, would have a prominent function in the new administrative system, as it would have consultative authority on all matters involving the Rapanui cultural heritage (article 29). It would also have an executive branch, called the Corporation for the Defense and Protection of the Rapanui Culture and Heritage (cdprch). This corporation would consist of fi ve members designated by the Council of Elders. It would have all the responsibilities currently exercised by the local offi ce of the National Corporation for Indigenous Development and some other Chilean government agencies concerned with cultural preservation (articles 43-44).
The most important task of the corporation, however, would be the handling of land matters. The draft bill recognizes all the lands without a private Rapanui titleholder to be traditionally owned by the Rapanui community (article 45). The title to all of those lands, currently claimed by the Chilean state, would be transferred to the cdprch, including all the rights and assets currently held by the Chilean National Development Corporation (corfo), which includes the valuable soils of the Vaitea state farm in the island's interior, as well as the Hotel Hanga Roa, currently owned by a Chilean company (transitory articles 1, 2, 5). In addition, the cdprch would also have the oversight over the island's water reserves (article 47).
In conclusion, the bill would definitely reform the administrative system of Rapa Nui. It contains no reference to Valparaíso region; the island's administrative relationship would be exclusively with Santiago. Most, if not all, Chilean government offi ces on the island that are currently dependent on various Santiago-or Valparaíso-based agencies would become centralized under the local administration. There is also strong cultural reference in the bill. For the fi rst time in a Chilean legal document, the name "Rapa Nui" would be used to refer to the island, though sometimes alongside the name "Easter Island." It would also be the fi rst offi cial document to mention the Rapanui fl ag (article 12e), and the teaching of Rapanui language and culture would be made mandatory at all levels of the public education system (article 48). The bill also mentions the possibility of a future administrative division of the island conforming to the traditional clan districts (articles 12v, 15i, 28h).
On the other hand, however, the local chief executive would still not be elected locally but would continue to be appointed from Chile. The governor's serving as both representative of the Chilean state and head of the local government might lead to confl icts of interest. Concerning the Council of Elders: If that institution is given an administrative function with substan-tial amounts of power, questions arise regarding how it will be composed and how it will function internally. The "Council of Elders" currently recognized by Chile consists of a faction led by Alberto Hotus, who claims council presidency for life, although the legitimacy of his claim is widely contested. If the council is to become an administrative agency, it ought to be reformed and democratized, but the draft bill does not address this issue. Also unclear is the future position and role of the currently existing municipality. Its functions are not clarifi ed, but its mention several times in the draft bill seems to imply the continuity of its existence. If that situation is maintained in the fi nal version, it would mean continuing the absurdity of having two parallel administrations (governor's offi ce and municipality) for a community consisting of only one village with a few thousand inhabitants. In summary, one could say that in spite of several progressive elements, the draft bill would only restructure the Chilean administrative system rather than create a system of true internal autonomy comparable to that provided by the statutes of the French or US Pacifi c territories.
One other burning issue in the debate on the special statute-the ongoing immigration of Chilean settlers-was raised by many participants at the January seminar (subdere, 26 Jan 2007), but no provision for regulating immigration is included in the draft bill. The draft only promises further discussion of that issue in parallel with the pursuit of the statute bill.
Meanwhile, on 5 June 2007, the Chilean Chamber of Deputies fi nally passed the constitutional reform by a vote of 100 to 1 (Informativo Provincial, June 2007, 1st issue; subdere, 5 June 2007). The reform was signed into law by President Bachelet on 27 June (Government of Chile 2007b), thus creating Rapa Nui and the Juan Fernández Islands off the Chilean coast as Special Territories, to be governed according to organic laws for each territory. This cleared the way for the Special Statute bill to be debated and eventually passed in Congress.
While the slow process of administrative reform continues, elections for the members of one of the existing political institutions, the Easter Island Development Commission (codeipa) were held on 10 June 2007, with some surprising results. According to the 1993 Indigenous Law, the commission operates as a consultative institution on all matters concerning the economic, social, and cultural development of the indigenous Rapanui population, including land matters. The commission consists of fi ve elected ethnic Rapanui, seven representatives of Chilean state institutions, as well as the governor, the mayor, and the president of the Council of Elders. At the 2007 elections, among 25 candidates, including all 5 incumbents, the highest numbers of votes were won by 2 non-incumbent pro-independence activists, Mario Tuki and Raúl Teao, who received 248 and 234 votes, respectively. Tuki and Teao have been known as outspoken land rights activists since the 1990s, and were coauthors of a 2003 report commissioned by the Chilean Historical Truth Commission, in which they denounced the Chilean takeover in 1888 and argued that the island is still an independent kingdom (Tuki and others 2003). Also newly elected was Luz Zasso Paoa with 152 votes, who became the fi rst female member of the commission. Among the incumbents, Jorge Emilio Pont and Marcelo Ika, who is also a municipal councilor, were reelected with 195 and 149 votes, respectively. Famed veteran community leader Alfonso Rapu, who led the 1964 popular uprising that ended arbitrary military rule over the island, and who was the island's fi rst elected mayor in the 1960s, curiously missed being reelected, securing only 109 votes. The two other incumbents, Rafael Tuki and Luis Pate, also missed reelection, each receiving fewer than 100 votes (Informativo Provincial, June 2007, 1st issue; Resultados Elecciones codeipa 2007).
The election results seem to point, on the one hand, to a growing dissatisfaction on the part of the community with the local political elite (affi liated with the ruling Chilean center-left parties), which has been running local institutions for more than a decade, and on the other hand, to a rise of Rapanui nationalists. Most of the latter had also previously overcome their differences and reunited themselves under the Rapanui Parliament, whereas previously Tuki and Teao had led their own respective organizations. The leadership of Alberto Hotus in the Council of Elders is now more contested than ever, and Mario Tuki is likely to challenge him in an upcoming election (Alberto Hotus, radio interview, broadcast 18 July 2007; Mario Tuki, public speech in the Rapanui Parliament, 20 July 2007).
While great changes are being initiated in both political institutions and local politics, the island's quality Finally, a rare occasion of international publicity for Rapa Nui arose in late June, when in a campaign to name the new seven wonders of the world through online voting, the moai of Rapa Nui made it to the fi nal selection of the top fourteen. Not only did the local political leadership participate enthusiastically in campaigns for their island, but the competition also boosted Chilean pride in claiming possession of the island. The campaign was also used to raise awareness about the special statute and development projects on Rapa Nui (La Nación, Special Edition, 22 June 2007). In the end, however, the island did not make it to the top seven (New Seven Wonders Web site).
Rapa Nui may thus not be one of the seven wonders of the world, but it is certainly a wondrous place to be watched closely, in this crucial period of political change, which will hopefully be for the best of its people. 
Sā moa
As expected, Sämoa's economy continued to thrive during the year. And again as expected, the main political developments of the latter half of 2006 concerned the aftermath of the 31 March general elections, the breakup of the Samoa Development United Party (sdup), and the monopoly of political power by the governing Human Rights Protection Party (hrpp). In the fi rst half of 2007, the major political development was the passing away, at age ninety-fi ve, of one of the world's oldest heads of state, Malietoa Tanumafi li II, and the election of Tui Atua Tupua Tamasese Tupuola Efi to replace him.
Although election petitions followed the general elections, there were not as many as in some previous years. Besides the usual disputes between the political parties, this time some of the petitions concerned members of the same political party. In one case, the Supreme Court found sdup mem-ber Paepae Kapeli Su'a guilty of two counts of bribery during the election period and deprived him of his seat. The petitioner, Tautoloitua Farani Posala, was also found guilty of three counts of bribery and three of treating (favorable treatment). Both were ruled ineligible to contest the by-election. In another case, hrpp Member of Parliament Leanapapa Laki brought an election petition alleging bribery and treating against his successful opponent Pa'u Sefo, who countersued. The Supreme Court upheld four allegations of bribery and one of treating against Pa'u and his election was declared void. Ten allegations of bribery and one of treating were also proved against Leanapapa. The court stated that neither could stand as candidates in the by-election.
The case that attracted the most interest, however, was brought by Samoa Party Leader Su'a Rimoni Ah Chong against Minister of Communications and Technology Mulitalo Vui Siafausa, alleging bribery and treating. On 3 August 2006, the Supreme Court dismissed all charges relating to bribery or treating against the minister on the grounds of insuffi cient evidence. This left one charge against him, involving an o'o or gift presentation (fi ne mats, food, or money, separately or together) he had made at Vaimoso, an urban village in Apia. The question for the court to decide was whether such an o'o was legal.
Su'a's petition stated that the o'o at Vaimoso was illegal because it occurred in a village that is not in the minister's constituency, while Mulitalo's lawyer, Toleafoa Solomona, argued it was an o'o regardless of where it was made. To support his case, the respondent acquired the services of a cultural specialist, Fuimaono Fereti Tupua, who argued that it was acceptable for an o'o to be made outside the boundaries of an electoral constituency because all electors were entitled to their share of the gifts. In other words, Fuimaono stated, an o'o should follow electors wherever they were (SO, 5 Aug 2006). Mulitalo had already presented an o'o to Lano, Asaga, and Pu'apu'a, the three villages in the constituency.
The legal opinion from lawyer Daryle Clarke of the Attorney General's Offi ce did not help the minister's case. Representing Electoral Commissioner Tanuvasa Isitolo, Clarke argued that if such an activity occurred outside the physical boundary of a constituency, it could not be regarded as an o'o. The implication was that if it was not an o'o and legitimized by custom, then it was bribery and therefore illegal. After nine days of hearings, the Supreme Court ruled that the o'o at Vaimoso was illegal and found Mulitalo guilty of bribery. In a thirty-fi ve-page decision, the court said it was not satisfi ed that there had been a change in custom to allow an o'o to be made outside a constituency. Mulitalo's election was therefore declared void.
In a counter-petition, Mulitalo fi led criminal charges against Su'a for treating and bribery. Three charges of bribery were brought against Su'a, one of which was later withdrawn. Su'a was accused of giving Faalafi Tauave sat$50 to induce him, his wife, and their children to vote for him in the general elections (currently, one Samoan tala [sat$)] = us$.36). He was also charged with giving a brand new television set to the family of Muliaga Faalafi to solicit his support and that of his family (SO, 28 Sept 2006) . Su'a denied both charges, saying his gift of money was motivated only by custom and appreciation for the generous hospitality shown to him by the family. The television set was a gift to a relative and his acts were the result of kindness and charity (SO, 20 Sept 2006) . On 26 September 2006, the court found that the bribery charge relating to the sat$50 gift to Faalafi Tauave was not proven, but upheld the charge relating to the television set.
Chief Justice Patu wondered why Su'a presented the television to Muliaga Faalafi 's mother, Malama, two days before the election, when he did not give out his usual Christmas gifts to the other poor, elderly, and sick residents of Lano. He noted that the family had not asked for a television set, but had only asked that Su'a take the old one for repairs in Apia. Su'a need only have told Malama that the television set could not be fi xed, or give her a new set after the elections. The important factors to be considered, the chief justice said, were the imminence of the election, and the value of the television set and aerial, more than sat$300-a big gift to a poor family. Patu concluded that "the dominant motive behind the giving of the tv set to Malama was not charity but to induce her to support and vote for the defendant at the election" (SO, 29 Sept 2006). Su'a was "shattered" by the decision, which incurred a sat$300 fi ne. It was clear, he said, that the law did not distinguish between relatives and electors. He vowed to return the Transparency International Integrity Award that he had won in May 2003.
Both Mulitalo and Su'a come from Lano village, and they were the only two candidates in the general elections. Their rivalry split the village into two factions. When Su'a lodged his petition against Mulitalo, he was banned from the village by the opposition. Mulitalo denied having anything to do with the ban. And when Mulitalo lost, Su'a's family home at Lano was burned by a person who was later caught and charged by police. In retaliation, Su'a complained to the Supreme Court, which ordered the Lano village council to revoke the ostracism order against Su'a or risk going to jail. In making the order, Justice Pierre Slicer said the village council's power was not greater than that of the Legislative Assembly, the constitution, the electoral act, the head of state, or the Supreme Court. The banishment was illegal because it violated the right of citizens to a free election (SO, 8 Aug 2006) . However, after further consultations between Chief Justice Patu and the two Australian judges of the court, the order was amended to enable the village council to fi le a petition with the Land and Titles Court to settle the dispute within seven days, failing which prosecutions would follow. Eventually, the village canceled its banishment order.
Several by-elections took place following the election petitions and the death of two sitting members of Parliament. In the by-election for Faasaleleaga No. 2 in September, Pa'u's daughter and hrpp candidate Letoa Rita edged out another hrpp candidate, Papalii Samuelu Petaia. At age thirty, Letoa Rita was the young-est of the candidates and the fi fth woman to be elected to the current Legislative Assembly. But the political struggle in this constituency did not end there, because Papalii lodged another election petition against Letoa Rita, alleging eleven counts of corrupt practices. The latter reciprocated by fi ling a counter petition, alleging nine instances of corrupt practices. After a fi ve-day hearing, the Supreme Court upheld fi ve allegations of bribery and three of treating against Letoa, but found that the allegations against Papalii had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The election was declared void and Letoa Rita was ordered to pay costs of sat$5,000 to Papalii. In his third attempt, Papalii Samuelu Petaia was fi nally in luck. He topped the poll with 384 votes, some 62 votes more than his nearest rival, Papalii Masipa'u. Soon after the general elections the stresses that had affected the Samoa Development United Party as a result of its poor performance in the elections were made manifest, dealing a blow to party politics in Sämoa. In August 2006, fi ve of the nine members of the party staged a coup d'état by ousting party leader Lemamea Ropati and substituting lawyer Asiata Vaai with Mulipola Oliva as deputy leader. The "rebels" claimed that under the constitution, the majority had the right to decide the party leader. However, changes in the command structure are normally carried out in a formal caucus meeting, and the only person who had the authority to call such a meeting was Lemamea. Accordingly, Lemamea and others-including veteran Aeau Peniamina, former Speaker of the Legislative Assembly; Fuimaono Naoia Tei, member for Falealili; and Sililoto Tolio Tuaifaiva, member for Vaimauga West-refused to accept the rebels' "misguided" action.
The rebel members claimed the reason for their change of allegiance was Lemamea's poor leadership qualities. For instance, Asiata said, the party had no plans for the next fi ve to ten years, and if the party was to succeed in toppling the Human Rights Protection Party from power, it had to move forward under new leadership (SO, 31 Aug 2006). Lemamea in turn accused Asiata of wanting to be the party's leader since he joined the Samoa Development United Party. In a letter to the Samoa Observer, he accused Asiata of removing Tupua Tamasese Efi as leader and Leilua Manuao as deputy leader of the Samoa National Development Party (sndp). Asiata was also responsible for changing the party's name from sndp to sdup. Having accomplished these goals, Lemamea said, Asiata continued to try and have Lemamea removed as leader. Despite attempts at reconciliation, the differences between the two factional leaders were too deep. Finally, Lemamea decided to step down as leader of the party. In tears he told supporters he could never work with Asiata again. However, he wished the new party leader well for the future (SO, 28 Sept 2006).
But this was not the end of the political drama. Under House regulations, a political party has to have a minimum of eight members to be recognized by the Speaker. At the end of the March general elections, the Samoa Development United Party had ten members, but lost one as a result of an election petition against Paepae Kapeli Su'a. As a result of the ensuing struggle for leadership, both Lemamea Ropati and Sililoto Tolo Tuaifaiva resigned from the party to become Independent members. This left only seven party members, one short of the required minimum. Asiata took the matter to the Supreme Court, 276-286 [2007] ).
In the review, Taafaki discussed events surrounding a march on Parliament in April 2006 organized by the Chamber of Commerce. Paeniu notes that the controversy involved a grant provided by Taiwan for Small/Medium Enterprises and administered by his ministry: "The article gave the impression that this grant was intended for the Chamber of Commerce. However, it was for small and medium sized enterprises, not for the Chamber of Commerce. To protect the grant from being politicized, I outlined in a mem-orandum to the secretary for Finance how the funds would be administered: us$100,000 was to be administered by the Small Business Centre in the Department of Commerce and Industries and used for training entrepreneurs; $30,000 would take the form of a direct grant to the Chamber of Commerce (this amount was determined based on an earlier written submission by the chamber); and the balance of the money would be administered by the Development Bank of Tuvalu (dbt). In the same memo I asked the secretary for Finance to work out clear terms of reference for the administration of the dbt grant, and I subsequently obtained the approval of cabinet for the policy overall. When I returned from an overseas trip I learned that the secretary and the president of the Chamber of Commerce had lobbied all the ministers, including the prime minister. After the Speaker refused a request to allow them to meet with Parliament, they called on their members to march. I met with the marchers when they arrived at Parliament and explained the government's side of the story. My department secretary, accountant, and aid coordinator were also present to clarify the situation with regard to the grant and the disbursement of funds. The marchers started disbursing as the members came to understand my side of the story."
Bikenibeu Paeniu also took exception to an assertion in the review that as Minister of Finance he was "fi rmly behind" a German-based proposal to establish a bank in Tuvalu, which turned out to be a scam. Paeniu states that in 2004 he was asked by Prime Minister Toafa to investigate the German proposal. "He handed me the documentation and especially a 'red ' [book] that contained all the details of the proposal. I expressed my reservations, but the prime minister insisted that I take it on board. It so happened that the Head of the Pacifi c Financial Technical Assistance Centre (pftac) was visiting, so I gave him the 'red' book and requested his advice. The pftac came back and advised no. However the Prime Minister insisted I take a closer look at it. In early 2005 we traveled to Germany, where we visited the oecd [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development] as well as the Centre for Money Laundering and Tax Offi ce in Bonn. Although we agreed for the German investors to come to Tuvalu to make a presentation to Cabinet and members of the public, their proposal was yet to be offi cially endorsed. I still had many serious questions about a proposal that seemed too good to be true. Negotiations continued, the proposal got more complex, and the press got involved. The late Robert Keith Reid was preparing to publish an article, and I managed to consult him in time and provided my side of the story. He fi nally wrote an article for Islands Business, which I liked very much (Keith-Reid and Pareti 2005). As the dialogue continued, I came to realize that the German proposal was becoming more complicated, when by this time it should have been more easily understood, so I came to the conclusion that it was a scam. Eventually I said no to the proposal and informed the cabinet accordingly. My decision was not the result of pressure from Australia, New Zealand, or anybody else. The whole proposal was a fake, and I came to believe that the investors were simply after Tuvalu's Trust Fund." démocrate), a centralist party, became president of the Territorial Assembly, with Victor Brial elected vice president, and Ermenegilde Simete president of the permanent commission.
On 22 Sixty-nine percent of Wallisians and Futunians turned out to vote during the second round of the presidential election on 6 May 2007; 3,866 voted for Nicolas Sarkozy (50.17 percent), while 3,840 voted for Ségolène Royal. There has been a clear shift in Wallis and Futuna toward the left, which may be due either to a change in attitude or to voters being weary of the principal local authorities, who have been in offi ce for a long time.
The victory of the departing ump deputy following the presidential elections seemed to be a foregone conclusion in June 2007. However, surprisingly, Victor Brial was beaten by Socialist Albert Likuvalu. This result was due to declining support for those in power too long (which is often a problem in small insular areas), as well as a combination of several other factors: Likuvalu's strong support for the former lavelua during the 2005 customary law crisis, internal confl icts in the local ump chapter, and private problems in Futuna.
The 2007 legislative elections were held on 10 and 17 June 2007. In the fi rst round, Victor Brial received 2,624 votes (33.7 percent); Albert Likuvalu 2,424 votes (31.1 percent); Atonia Ilalio 973 votes (12.5 percent); Pesamino Taputai 661 votes (8.5 percent); and Ermenegilde Simete 1,101 votes (14.1 percent). The smaller parties then joined forces with the larger ones, as they usually do. Simete (ump) and Taputai (udf) from the territorial majority gave their support to Victor Brial and, once Atonio Ilalio, the third candidate, had been eliminated, he asked his supporters to vote for Likuvalu. In the meantime, Donald Mercier, though Socialist, stated prior to the fi rst round that he would vote for Brial, asking his territorial voters to do the same.
In the second round on 17 June 2007, Likuvalu received 4,152 votes (51.79 percent), while Brial only received 3,865. It should be noted that in the fi rst round the number of people voting by power of attorney was 20 percent, while the number of abstaining voters was 29.67 percent. In the second round, 27.50 percent abstained. Likuvalu, the new deputy, was born on 14 November 1943 in Alo. He was the fi rst Wallisian to obtain a baccalaureate, and after earning a master's degree in geography from the University of Lyon, he became the fi rst certifi ed teacher in history-geography. His opposition party, Alliance d'opposition (opposing the ump), was recently absorbed by the local chapter of the national Socialist party (ps) to which he belongs. Victor Brial has appealed the results of the election.
In customary law matters, the Administrative Court of Mata'utu studied approximately fi fty appeals presented by the leaders of Uvea on 12 March 2007. These were intended to render null and void the prefectorial decrees made by Xavier de Fürst, who represented the French State during the 2005 crisis. At that time the prefect had, among other things, published several decrees recognizing the customary law chiefs who were in favor of change. The court fi nally rendered null and void the decrees made by Fürst and ordered the State to pay damages to the territorial constituency of Uvea, or in other words, to the members of the lavelua's governing body. The court cited Article 3 of the 1961 statute that in part specifi cally "prohibits any involvement of the Republic's institutions in the operation of customary law institutions, and does not give any administrative authority either to the State or the territory in questions of customary law." Lavelua Tomasi Kulimoetoke, king of Wallis since 1959 and father of six, died on 7 May 2007 at the age of eighty-eight. A six-month period of mourning was decreed and a new lavelua cannot be named until it is over. Some people have raised the possibility of amending customary law to replace the lavelua by the three district chiefs (faipule), thereby reinforcing their authority.
In 
